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Abstract
Recent progress in the large scale mapping of social networks is opening new
quantitative windows into the structure of human societies. These networks
are largely the result of how we access and utilize information. Here I show
that a universal decision mechanism, where we base our choices on the ac-
tions of others, can explain much of their structure. Such collective social
arrangements emerge from successful strategies to handle information flow at
the individual level. They include the formation of closely-knit communities
and the emergence of well-connected individuals. The latter can command
the following of others while only exercising ordinary judgment.
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In recent years there has been growing interest in the quantitative structure of human
societies. It has emerged that we are part of heterogeneous networks or graphs [1–4], sets
of links that connect each one of us to all our acquaintances. Not all people are alike: some
live almost isolated, most belong to distinguishable communities [1,5] and a small fraction
of the population is made up of exceptionally well connected individuals [6]. Social networks
have the remarkable property that one can reach anyone else through a very small number
of connections - the famous six degrees of separation [7,8].
These findings beg important questions: Why are social networks invariably clustered in
communities? Why are there individuals with such different connectivity? Answering these
puzzles requires tying the morphology of social networks to their function [2,9,10]. Similar
problems occur in the study of other complex networks, for example, dealing with gene and
protein-protein interactions [11–13], metabolism [14,15], ecosystems [16,17] (foodwebs) and
neural activity. Thus understanding the simultaneous robustness and adaptability of these
complex systems in the light of their function is a general problem at the forefront of the
current scientific agenda across many disciplines [9].
The difficulty of this approach consists in defining the function of each of these com-
plex networks in a way that captures their essence and simultaneously permits quantitative
progress. Clearly many details of social behavior, in particular, appear too rich and our
understanding of them remains too qualitative to fall in this class. There are however im-
portant well documented exceptions.
A familiar situation is having to choose between seemingly equivalent options, at least
given the amount of information and time at our disposal [18]. In practice many of our
decisions fall in this class. This leads to a degeneracy of choice, typical also of situations
when relevant information is difficult to discriminate from too much noise, or when it cannot
be trusted. In these situations we often rely on the observation of the actions of others we
know as the basis for our decisions [19–23]. This strategy has two important advantages:
we can be sure not to do worse than most of the people we know and, in addition, we may
actually join a winning trend early and profit from it.
Recently this type of discriminating imitation has become the focus of an extensive
empirical literature in economy [19] and the social sciences. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch [20,21] collected a vast amount of empirical evidence that establishes the universal
importance of the choices of others in influencing our own and were able to model this
phenomenon in simple terms. They dubbed the formation of the trend or fad that often
results an information cascade; a process whereby sequential individual choices propagate
a piece of information through the entire population [22]. This phenomenon is also often
liked (qualitatively) to the spread of an epidemic [10,22]. Interestingly, information cascades
lead to the spontaneous formation of large consensus where there are a priori no individual
preferences.
Here I use an implementation of these ideas [23] consisting of a population of N agents,
facing a choice among L labels. At each time step individuals compare the relative growth
rate of their label to that of one of their immediate acquaintances’, chosen at random. If
the latter’s growth rate (the trend’s relative momentum) is greater the agent switches to
his neighbor’s trend; otherwise he keeps his. The model has one additional ingredient: if a
trend slows down individuals may decide to take a risk in something new (an empty label).
This effect is modeled by pcrit, the relative growth rate below which non-conformism sets in.
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Here pcrit = 10
−5, which results in population wide trends or cascades [23]. References to
other related dynamical implementations [22] (including models of herding) and additional
discussion are given elsewhere [23].
Typical dynamics [23] are characterized by cycles alternating population disorder, when
many different trends coexist, and order, when most of the population falls into the same
label. Both collective states of order and disorder are dynamically unstable making the
evolution very sensitive to chance events [20,21,23]. As a result it becomes very difficult
in practice for an external observer to profit from the reckoning that agents are following
trends, especially when the number of choices becomes large.
To explore the effects of the underlying network morphology on the dynamics I generate
(binary) artificial social networks as small world graphs [1,24]. These are random graphs
with clustering: N individuals are represented as nodes, each with an average number of
connections z. Clustering is produced by dividing the population into communities, each
characterized by an average higher degree of internal connections per node zin than external
zout connections (z = zin + zout).
In addition to measure correlations between parts of the population it is useful to define
a label state vector
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is a (positive definite) measure of the correlation between different groups, see Fig.1.
Fig. 1 shows the correlation between several subsets of the population, within a com-
munity, between two distinct communities and for a control set of individuals with random
connections. It is now clear why it is a good defensive strategy to belong to a tightly knit
collective: communities are islands of information coherence. Thanks to the large redun-
dancy of personal connections inside the community the coherence of local information is
preserved over time and personal deviations inside the group are small compared to those
to the outside. This remains true even if a few individuals or connections are lost.
Comforting as it may be to keep up with our neighbors it may actually be better to
be a step ahead. As we discussed above this is a tall order, even if one is fully informed
of the state of the whole population. Figure 2 shows the success rate of several criteria
attempting to predict the emerging new trend at the particularly important time when a
former dominant movement collapses, i.e. when it becomes as large as the largest secondary
trend. All criteria based on the full knowledge of the state of population at this particular
time (the largest secondary trend, the fastest growing one or the trend with the largest
product of momentum and size) are far from good and become very poor for large number
of competing choices L.
Interestingly there is a simple alternative solution - it relies on connections, not reasoning
or information. I examine this scenario by introducing a new well-connected individual into
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FIG. 1. The correlation between two halves of the same community (green), halves of distinct
communities (blue) and a set of individuals with random connections (red) for N = 256, L = 1000,
z = 8, divided in 4 communities (see text). The correlation inside a community is always close
to 1. The correlation and synchronization of choices between distinct communities is low for
small zout, becoming higher as the number of connections between them increases. Individuals
with random connections display intermediate correlation. For high zout the original communities
merge together. Error bars denote standard deviations over a set of 20 network realizations and
many cascade cycles.
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FIG. 2. The success rate of several criteria for predicting the next winning trend at the time
when the dominant movement decays. The next winning trend is not easily determined as the
largest secondary trend (blue), the fastest growing (orange) or even the trend with the largest
product of size and momentum (green). The best predictor is the choice of the hub (red), partic-
ularly as the number of choices L becomes large. The upper panel refers to lower hub visibility
(his input is considered on average by each individual with probability phub = 1/8, each time), the
lower panel to higher visibility (phub = 1/2). Error bars are as in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 3. An example of a (binary) social network with N = 128, z = 4, divided into 4 commu-
nities (red, blue, green, orange) and with a hub (central node). Here the state of the hub is seen
by all individuals with probability phub = 0.25 each time, but has input from z = 4 individuals.
As such the actions of the hub are very visible but not better informed.
the population, a network hub, as in Fig. 3. The hub bases his decisions, like any other
agent, on the state of an average number of other individuals z, but his choices can be seen
by everybody else. What is particular about the evolution is illustrated in Figs. 2 and 4:
the hub is exceptionally good at picking the next winning trend early, before it becomes
dominant - the perfect winning strategy.
However the hub is, by construction, neither better informed nor animated by superior
decision making. This apparent paradox is easily dispelled: the hub’s actions are very visible
to others. Any reasonable decision on his part (the adoption of any growing label) has a
large probability of being immediately followed by many (∼ Nphub, at the next iteration) and
thus to make the winning trend. This property is independent of the underlying community
structure and is enhanced for larger populations (larger N), as long as phub(N) is such that
d(Nphub)/dN > 0. Thus, it is popularity, not knowledge or reasoning, that leads to the
most successful strategy in an environment characterized by strong choice degeneracy.
Given some memory the hub’s successes reinforce his position and (apparent) foresight.
Each correct ’prediction’ encourages others to heed his choices and follow at the next op-
portunity. This reinforces the hub’s popularity, allowing him to pick the next winning trend
with greater certainty and so on: the process is self-reinforcing. It also naturally leads to a
specific form of preferential attachment [25], where the most connected node - the best trend
predictor - is preferred. Thus, under choice degeneracy, one should expect the appearance
of well-connected, very visible individuals as a social network evolves.
Nodes with an exceptionally large connectivity are a common property of other complex
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FIG. 4. Fig. 4 Evolution of the dominant trend (solid line) and the hub’s trend (red circles)
for L = 10. The hub invariably picks the next dominant trend correctly and early, qualities that
reinforce his social role as a bellwether.
networks, including scale-free graphs [26] describing e.g. WWW, power-grids and the large
scale features of protein-protein interactions in vivo. It has been pointed [27,28] out that
such networks’ utmost fragility is due to the loss of these key nodes. Trend dynamics shows
how this fragility may only be apparent in social networks. The hub is a common node,
only its degree of outgoing connections is exceptionally large. I argued above that there is a
fundamental instability for a common individual to be promoted to this position. Because
social connections are rearranged on much faster time scales than nodes [29], upon loss of
a hub a new one can quickly develop from another node and the structural integrity of the
network will be preserved after a short transient. Moreover the addition of a second well-
connected node dealing with the same information reduces the predictability of emerging
trends, unless the two hubs work in tandem (as would happen under specific assortative
mixing [29]) and so forth. It is however perfectly natural for separate hubs to coexist if they
relate to different social dimensions [30], i.e. if they deal with different types of information.
In this way the large scale structure of human societies, when averaged over time and social
dimensions may be characterized by many hubs with varying reaches and interdependencies.
These properties may lead to the emergence of interesting scale-invariances in large social
networks associated with decision making and information flow.
Observing the actions of others is a universal simple mechanism that allows us to handle
imperfect information in our complex social environment to make difficult decisions. We
can protect ourselves from the tyranny of fashions by associating into tightly knit commu-
nities or we may try to set trends by influencing the choices of others through our social
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connections. Here I showed that these successful individual strategies lead to stable social
arrangements, which coincide with some of the most notable observed structures of social
networks. Trend dynamics breaks the degeneracy of our individual choices and leads to the
spontaneous formation of collective movements. Whenever concerted social action is more
productive than the sum of individual efforts social hubs may become the social mechanism
that facilitates the creation of consensus most promptly and predictably.
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